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This papers studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the
context of ﬁnite population potential games. Action revision, link
creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time
Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this
process in closed form, as well as the marginal distribution over ac-
tion proﬁles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is
shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomoge-
neous random graph. Furthermore, a characterization of the set of
stochastically stable states is provided, generalizing existing results
to models with endogenous interaction structures.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of social networks has recently gained interest in various
ﬁelds in the sciences and social sciences. By now there is a rich literature
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1on social networks in economics; the textbooks by Jackson (2008) and
Vega-Redondo (2007) give a concise overview on this emerging ﬁeld. Re-
cently, tools from evolutionary game theory have been used to study the
co-evolution of networks and play. Models in this vein are Jackson and
Watts (2002), Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005), and Hojman and Szeidl
(2006). Another type of model, which is more in the tradition of statis-
tical physics, puts more weight on modelling the evolution of the net-
work, without paying too much attention to the role of strategic inter-
actions. Prominent examples are Ehrhardt et al. (2006; 2008a;b). This
paper aims to combine these two streams of literature in a very simplis-
tic model. I present a stochastic co-evolutionary model which includes
three sub-processes: action adjustment, link creation, or link destruc-
tion. These three sub-processes are combined into one continuous-time
Markov process called a co-evolutionary model with noise. For posi-
tive noise levels the process is ergodic. For the class of potential games
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996) many fundamental characteristics of the
system are explicitly computable. Key to all the results in this paper is
the closed-form expression of the invariant distribution. This probability
distribution describes the long-run behavior of the system in two com-
plementary ways. First, it gives us complete information on the joint
probability distribution over action proﬁles and networks which governs
the “equilibrium” of the stochastic dynamics. Second, by virtue of ergod-
icity, it gives us complete information which states are more frequently
observed over time compared to others. From the invariant distribution
one can deduce the conditional probability distribution over networks
for a ﬁxed proﬁle of actions. In the parlance of random graph theory
this gives us the ensemble of random graphs. The interesting result is
that the model generates so-called inhomogeneous random graphs. Inhomo-
geneous random graphs are a straightforward extension of the classical
random graph model proposed by Erdös and Rényi (1960), where the
probability with which two vertices are linked depend in some way on
2the characteristics of the vertices. Söderberg (2002) and Bollobás et al.
(2007) are models in this direction. These papers ﬁx the edge success
probability at the outset. On the contrary, in the present model the edge
success probability is derived from the long-run equilibrium of the sys-
tem, hence is explained endogenously. To the best of my knowledge, this
is a new result, which opens the way to interesting linkages between evo-
lutionary game theory and the theory of random graph dynamics. This
relationship is further explored in the companion article Staudigl (2009b).
Next, I provide an expression for the marginal distribution over action
proﬁles in the population. This measure is interesting if one is not in-
terested in the effects of the interaction structure. Finally, we explore
the well-known relationship between potential maximizers and stochas-
tic stability (for early work in this direction see for instance Blume, 1993,
Young, 1998, ch. 6). A fairly general argument is provided, showing
that as noise vanishes the invariant distribution concentrates on the set of
potential maximizers. At ﬁrst sight, this might not be a too surprising re-
sult. However, former models were only concerned with ﬁxed interaction
structures, so the conclusion of our theorem extends the previous ones.
Moreover, the argument presented in this paper is much more general
than the proofs in the just mentioned literature. This technique allows
to study the low-noise behavior of the invariant distribution also in more
complicated models, as for instance Staudigl (2009a). Since the class of
potential games is rather narrow, I also sketch brieﬂy how the results ob-
tained extend if the potential game assumption is dropped. In Staudigl
(2009b) a rather general class of co-evolutionary dynamics is presented,
and I refer to this paper for further details. However, many games arising
in economic applications have this special structure. The most prominent
class of potential games are congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973). They
also arise in Cournot oligopoly models with linear inverse demand func-
tions (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Recently, Sandholm (2007) studies
a mechanism design problem where the planner can construct a pricing
3scheme, so that the transformed game is a potential game, which leads,
in his model, to the long-run selection of socially efﬁcient outcomes. Ui
(2000) has shown interesting interconnections between the Shapley value
and potential functions, and Morris and Ui (2005) use potential methods
to study equilibria which are robust to incomplete information.
Closest to the present work is a recent paper by Ehrhardt et al. (2008b),
who study a similar dynamic process. Their link formation mechanism is
designed in such a way that only players who play the same action form
a link. This is interpreted as a pure homophily based linking process.
They also characterize the induced ensemble of random graphs, and ﬁnd
that the network consists of disjoint components, each following the dis-
tribution of an Erdös-Rényi ensemble. This paper extends their result
by allowing for much more general behavioral rules, both in the action
adjustment and the link creation process, which results in a richer inter-
action structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model
framework is explained in detail. In sections 3 and 4, I derive the asymp-
totic characteristics of the model. Sections 5 and 6 present an analysis
of the joint distribution of action proﬁles and social networks as well as
the induced marginal distributions. Section 7 characterizes stochastically
stable states. Section 8 sketches a general class of stochastic processes on
the co-evolution of networks and play. A, found at the end of the paper,
collects lengthy and technical proofs.
2 The model
Consider a ﬁnite population of individuals i, j,k ∈ I = {1,2,..., N},
members of which are called players or agents. Each player can choose
one out of q different pure actions from the set A = {a1,a2,...,aq}. I
will also say “playing action r” with the understanding that this is action
ar. An action proﬁle (conﬁguration) is a tuple α = (αi)i∈I ∈ AI. When
4individual i meets individual j, they engage in a 2-player game deﬁned
by the payoff function u : A2 → R. We assume that this function is
symmetric in the following sense:
Assumption 1.
(∀a,a0 ∈ A) : u(a,a0) = u(a0,a) (2.1)
Games with this special property are known as (exact) potential games
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996). This deﬁnes the base game Γb := (A,u).
The interaction structure is modeled as an undirected graph (network).
Let I(2) denote the set of unordered pairs of players. There are N(N −
1)/2 such pairs. A graph is a pair G = (I,E), where we interpret I as
the set of vertices (nodes) and E = E(G) ⊆ I(2) the set of edges (links). An
edge is an unordered pair of players (i, j) ≡ (j,i) with the interpretation
that if (i, j) ∈ E, then players i and j play against each other. If E = I(2)
we obtain the complete graph on I, denoted by Gc. In this graph each indi-
vidual is connected to everybody else and we obtain the standard global
matching model. If E = ∅ then we speak of the empty graph Ge. A graph
G0 = (I0,E0) is a subgraph of G = (I,E) if I0 ⊆ I and E0 ⊆ E. For
two disjoint subsets of players V,V0 ⊂ I denote the set of edges that join
players from V with players belonging to V0 (and vice-versa) as E(V,V0).
All graphs on I differ only in terms of their edge set E. Let G[I] de-
note the set of graphs that can be formed on the vertex set I. It is of-
ten more convenient to work with networks via the function g : I(2) ×
G[I] → {0,1}, assigning to each pair (i, j) ∈ I(2) the value g((i, j),G) ≡
g((j,i),G) ≡ gi
j(G) ∈ {0,1}. If gi
j(G) = 1 then players i and j are linked
under the graph G and play against each other. Thus, we have the iden-
tity E(G) = {(i, j) ∈ I(2)|gi
j(G) = 1} for all graphs G ∈ G[I]. It follows
that every graph G ∈ G[I] can be identiﬁed through the realization of
links g(G) = (gi
j(G))1≤i<j≤N ∈ {0,1}I(2)
. In view of this equivalence, we
will identify the space G[I] ≡ G as the set of all possible edge realizations
{0,1}I(2)
, members of which are vectors g = (gi
j)1≤i≤j≤N. The number of




5A population state is the pair ω = (α, g) ∈ Ω ≡ AI × G. It contains
an action proﬁle and a network. Let α
av
i := (α1,...,αi−1,av,αi,...,αN).
Let g ⊕ (i, j) denote the network that we obtain if the (previously non-
existing) edge connecting players i and j is created, and g 	 (i, j) be the
network resulting from the deletion of the edge connecting players i and
j.






j = 1 & αj = ar}.
The set N i ∪ {i} ≡ ¯ N i deﬁnes the closed interaction neighborhood of a
player. There are κi
r(ω) := |{j ∈ I|gi
j = 1 & αj = ar}| r-players against
which player i has to play. The total number of games in which player
i is involved is given by his degree κi(ω) = ∑
q
r=1 κi
r(ω). From all these
interactions, player i receives the total payoff








In analogy with standard population games, I will call the collection of
payoff functions π = (πi)i∈I the structured population game.
3 Co-evolution with noise
Consider the family of perturbed Markov processes
Mβ = (Ω,F,P,(Yβ(t))t≥0, β ∈ R+,
where Ω is the ﬁnite state space of pairs ω = (α, g), F a suitably chosen
σ-algebra (e.g. 2Ω), P : F → [0,1] a probability measure, and (Yβ(t))t≥0 a
family of Ω-valued random variables indexed by a noise parameter β ≥ 0
and a continuous time parameter t. Mβ will deﬁne a co-evolutionary
6model with noise. The time evolution of this process can be studied by





whose components are mappings ηβ : Ω×Ω → R satisfying 0 ≤ ηβ(ω →
ˆ ω) < ∞ for all ˆ ω 6= ω, and ∑ ˆ ω ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. The value
ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) is interpreted as the rate with which the process moves from
state ω to some other state ˆ ω.1 The generator is deﬁned by the following
sub-processes.
Action update: The way how players update their actions is modeled as
in Blume (2003) or Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007). Players are en-
dowed with independent Poisson alarm clocks, ringing at the com-
mon rate ν > 0. The total rate of this subprocess is thus Nν. Con-
ditional on the event of a revision opportunity, player i receives the
chance to adjust his action with probability 1/N. When player i gets
a revision opportunity he calculates the current expected payoff of
all of his pure actions, given the set of neighbors, but his computa-
tions are perturbed by some random shock εi = (εi
a)a∈A. Assume
that these perturbations are i.i.d. type 1 extreme value distributed,2






















1In a very small time interval [t,t + h), the probability that the process moves from
ω to ˆ ω is then approximately ηβ(ω → ˆ ω)h.
2This formulation of stochastically perturbed payoffs has a very long tradition in the
theory of discrete choice, see e.g. Anderson et al. (1992). For a more recent treatise and
alternative interpretation see van Damme and Weibull (2002). The cumulative distrib-
ution function of a doubly exponential distributed random variable with mean 0 and
variance
β2π2
6 is F(x) = exp[−exp(−x/β − γ)]. Beside its importance in theoretical
economics, it has also been used in experimental studies, see for instance McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995), where it is known as the “quantal response function”.
7The transition ω = (α, g) → ˆ ω = (α
ar
i , g) 6= ω proceeds therefore at
a rate
ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) = νbi(ar|ω). (3.3)
Link creation: Here ideas of the stochastic-actor model, developed in Sni-
jders (2001), are used. The key-ingredients of this model are a rate
function, governing the pace at which individuals update their con-
nections, and an objective function, capturing the preferences of the
individuals concerning link creation. For the rate function, I make
the following assumption:
Assumption 2. The rate functions of individuals take the form
(∀i ∈ I)(∀ω ∈ Ω) : λi,β(ω) = ∑
k/ ∈ ¯ N i(ω)
exp(u(αi,αk)/β). (3.4)
This formulation reﬂects the intuitive idea that players, who expect
a large proﬁt from interactions with currently unknown players,
should be relatively fast in creating their network. Let
¯ λβ(ω) := ∑
i∈I




so that the conditional probability that player i receives a link cre-
ation opportunity is simply λi,β(ω)/¯ λβ(ω). Conditional on this
event, player i screens the set of unknown players (i.e. those player
who are not neighbors yet) and picks one player from this set who
yields the highest per-interaction payoff, perturbed by a noisy signal
ζi = (ζi
k)k/ ∈ ¯ N i(ω). Hence, the conditional probability that i selects j





j ≥ u(αi,αk) + ζi
k ∀k / ∈ ¯ N i|ω

. (3.5)
If we assume that the random perturbation follows the same dis-
tributional law as in the action adjustment process one obtains the
logit formula




∑k/ ∈ ¯ N i(ω) exp(u(αi,αk)/β)
. (3.6)
8For general link creation probabilities (3.5), the rate of transiting
from state ω = (α, g) to state ˆ ω = (α, g ⊕ (i, j)) is




Using Assumption 2 and (3.6) gives us
ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) = 2exp(u(αi,αj)/β). (3.8)
Link destruction: To make the dynamic interesting, we need a process
that counteracts the creation of links. Following recent papers by
Ehrhardt et al. (2006; 2008b), I assume that there exists an exogenous
random shock removing any of these links. This unguided drift
term models the phenomenon of environmental volatility, and is a key
ingredient of the model. It captures the idea that connections are not
everlasting, but as time goes by and players change their behavior,
the proﬁtability of links will also change, making some connections
obsolete. The rate at which the link (i, j) disappears is given by
ξ > 0.3 Hence, in a very small time interval [t,t+h) the probability of
survival of a currently existing edge (i, j) is ξh + o(h). The expected
life time of an edge is 1/ξ. Hence, starting from ω = (α, g), the
transition rate to ˆ ω = (α, g 	 (i, j)) is
ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) = ξ. (3.9)
The last case we have to consider is a “phantom switch”, i.e. the transition
rate ηβ(ω → ω). Deﬁne the rate of such an event as
ηβ(ω → ω) = −Λ(β,ξ)(ω), (3.10)
3The assumption of constant link decay rates is less restrictive as it may seem. Since
link creation probabilities are payoff driven, players will be more likely to establish
links which are associate with higher per-interaction payoff. Hence, if a highly valu-
able link disappears, ceteris paribus, there is a relatively high probability that it will be
re-established in future periods. Extending to heterogeneous link destruction rates is








bi,β(a|ω) + ξe(g) + ¯ λβ(ω). (3.11)
To summarize, the inﬁnitesimal generator of the co-evolutionary model
with noise Mβ is deﬁned as
ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) =

       
       
νbi,β(a|ω) if ˆ ω = (αa
i, g) 6= ω,
2exp(u(αi,αj)/β) if ˆ ω = (α, g ⊕ (i, j)),
ξ if ˆ ω = (α, g ⊕ (i, j)),
−Λ(β,ξ)(ω) if ˆ ω = ω,
0 otherwise.
(3.12)
It is easily veriﬁed that ∑ ˆ ω∈Ω ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. For β > 0
we observe that ηβ(ω → ω0) > 0 for ω 6= ω0, meaning that there can be
no single state that is absorbing. Irreducibility of the generator follows
from this easily. Furthermore, in view of the ﬁniteness of the state space,
positive recurrence of the process follows. Hence, the Markov process is
ergodic.
4 The invariant distribution
By ergodicity, the co-evolutionary model with noise admits a unique
invariant distribution µ(β,ξ) = (µ(β,ξ)(ω))ω∈Ω. In terms of the genera-
tor ηβ, this probability distribution satisﬁes the global balance equation
µ(β,ξ)ηβ = 0. Determining this probability vector is facilitated in the spe-
cial class of reversible Markov processes. Given the model Mβ with gen-
erator ηβ, we can deﬁne for a given T > 0 its time reversal as the process
( ˆ Yβ(t))0≤t≤T, with ˆ Yβ(t) = Yβ(T − t). A Markov process (Yβ(t))t≥0 is
said to be reversible, if its time reversal has the same distribution as the
original process (see Stroock, 2005, ch. 5). In our case, reversibility will
appear as an equilibrium phenomenon (i.e. (Y(t)β)t≥0 is reversible in equi-
librium). The detailed balance condition, relative to the inﬁnitesimal gener-
10ator ηβ, gives a sufﬁcient condition for µ(β,ξ) being an invariant distrib-
ution. The measure µ(β,ξ) is in detailed balance with the generator ηβ if
(∀ω, ˆ ω ∈ Ω) : µ(β,ξ)(ω)ηβ(ω → ˆ ω) = µ(β,ξ)( ˆ ω)ηβ( ˆ ω → ω). (4.1)
A probability distribution satisfying the detailed balance condition (4.1)
must be an invariant distribution. Conversely, a probability distribu-
tion satisfying condition (4.1) implies reversibility of the corresponding
Markov process.
Theorem 4.1. Given (β,ξ)  (0,0), the unique invariant distribution of the
co-evolutionary model with noise Mβ equals





























is the the partition func-
tion.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A consequence of ergodicity is the convergence of long-run averages of









1{Yβ(s)=ω} ds = µ(β,ξ)(ω)

= 1,
where 1A is the indicator function of a measurable set A ⊆ Ω, and for












where Eµ(β,ξ)[f] = ∑
ω∈Ω
f(ω)µ(β,ξ)(ω) is the expected value of the function
f under the invariant distribution µ(β,ξ).
Observe that for β > 0 µ(β,ξ) is a full support distribution on Ω. Thus,
the only thing one may be able to deduce from it is to classify a subset of
11states which receive more mass than others. The subsequent chapters are
devoted to this exercise.
Deﬁne an aggregate utility index as the sum of individual utilities,












Efﬁciency, in terms of this index, is a state in the argmax set of (4.3).
Lemma 4.1 shows that one can construct from eq. (4.3) a real-valued
function, which captures the effects of individual utilities due to a single
change in the state variable ω. In game theory such a function is known
as an exact potential (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Since the state variable
encompasses the connections among the players, but these are not part
of the strategy of a single player, a potential function for π = (πi)i∈I is
not a potential function in its game-theoretic sense. However, it fulﬁlls
the same role in the dynamic analysis to come as a conventional potential
function in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996), and so we will still
call such a function a potential function for the structured population
game, having in mind that this does not conform with its established use
in game theory.
Lemma 4.1. The structured population game (πi)i∈I is a potential game with
exact potential function














Proof. We have to show that
P(α
av
i , g) − P(α, g) = πi(α
av
i , g) − πi(α, g), and
P(α, g ⊕ (i, j)) − P(α, g) = u(αi,αj)
Let us start with the event of a link creation between players i and j. The
destruction of such a link has the same consequences. A direct computa-
tion shows that
P(α, g ⊕ (i, j)) − P(α, g) =
1
2
(u(αi,αj) + u(αj,αi)) = u(αi,αj),
12by symmetry of the payoff function u. Now, concerning a change in action
of player i, we now have to take care of the environment of this player.
All players in the set I \ ¯ N i(ω) are not affected by the change in player
i’s action. Fix the state ω and suppose player i switches to action av. The
new state is therefore ω
av
i , and we can write
U(α
av








= U(α, g) + ∑
j:gi
j=1








Now consider the function H : Ω × R+ × R++ → R, deﬁned as






This function acts as a a graph Hamiltonian for the invariant distribution.4
One sees that there are two components combined in the graph Hamil-
tonian. The ﬁrst component is the potential function of the game, which
measures (up to a linear scaling) the aggregate utility of the population.
The second part is a size measure of the interaction graph, weighted by
the volatility parameter ξ. If ξ > 2 then too large graphs (measured by
the number of edges) lead to a reduction in the value of the Hamiltonian.
This effect is in turn weighted by the noise level β. Proposition 4.1 shows
that it contains all the information one needs to determine the invariant
distribution of the process Mβ. Its proof is straightforward and therefore
omitted.
4For a general discussion of this concept see Park and Newman (2004). In statistical
mechanics a Hamiltonian is, roughly, a measure of the energy of a system. In the
simplest case it is the sum of the potential energy and kinetic energy. This description
ﬁts also perfectly to the form of the Hamiltonian (4.5).
13Proposition 4.1. The stationary distribution of the co-evolutionary model with





∑ ˆ ω∈Ω e
1
βH( ˆ ω,β,ξ). (4.6)
From the deﬁnition of the Hamiltonian (4.5), one can see that a large value
of β, combined with ξ > 2, implies that too large graphs will not receive
too much weight in the long run. A small value of β means in turn that,
for any given volatility level ξ, the penalty of densely connected societies
has a small inﬂuence on the invariant distribution. It is exactly this trade-
off between β and volatility ξ which makes the form of the invariant
distribution interesting. High environmental volatility, accompanied with
moderate noise will lead to a sparsely connected society.
5 The ensemble of random graphs
Given ω = (α, g) ∈ Ω, deﬁne the set of r-players as Ir(ω) := {i ∈ I|αi =
ar}. Sets of this form will be called action classes. Every state assigns
each player to a single action class. Hence, the family {Ir}1≤r≤q deﬁnes
a partition on the set I. Fix a partition I ≡ {Ir}1≤r≤q and deﬁne the
subspace
Ω(I) := {ω ∈ Ω|Ir(ω) = Ir, 1 ≤ r ≤ q}.
We say that state ω agrees with the action partition I, if it is contained
in Ω(I). Note that the deﬁnition of the set Ω(I) does not say anything
about network structures. Once we condition on an action partition, we
ﬁx a strategy conﬁguration α ∈ AI, but allow for all potential networks.
In other words, µ(β,ξ)(ω|I) ≡ µ(β,ξ)(g|α).
Given a partition I, the product operator ∏
N
i=1 ∏j>i has the same mean-
ing as the product operator ∏
q
r=1 ∏i∈Ir(ω) ∏v≥r ∏j∈Iv(ω);j>i. This implies
that we are able to re-formulate the stationary distribution in terms of























For proper normalization of this measure one has to compute the total




Let er|v(ω) := ∑i∈Ir(ω) ∑j∈Iv(ω),j>i gi
j, denote the number of edges con-



















Setting θ(β,ξ)(ω) := (θ
(β,ξ)

































Given an action partition I, consider the subgraph Gr|v := (Ir ∪ Iv,Er|v),









r|v . Lemma A.1 in Ap-














where δx,y = 1 if, and only if, x = y, and 0 otherwise. The main result of
this section is then the following result.
15Theorem 5.1 (The Erdös-Rényi Decomposition). Fix an action partition I
and (β,ξ)  (0,0).
















(b) The statistical ensemble of subgraphs G[Ir ∪ Iv] is an Erdös-Rényi graph







Proof. See Appendix A.
Part (a) of the Theorem shows that the equilibrium ensemble of graphs
boils down to an inhomogeneous random graph (Söderberg, 2002, Bollobás
et al., 2007). For an arbitrary action proﬁle eq. (5.3) gives us complete in-
formation about the probability with which an r-strategist interacts with
players from other action classes. Thus, if one wants to make a prob-
abilistic prediction about the interaction pattern between r-players and











what is exactly the probability measure of the random graph model of
Erdös and Rényi (1960). Since this the interactions among r and v-players
follow a Bernoulli distribution, the expected number of interactions, given







16For the covariances we see that
Covµ(β,ξ)[er|v,er|l|I] =
(






r|v ) if v = l.
The fact that the total graph can be regarded as a collection of inde-
pendent Erdös-Rényi graphs (with different edge success probabilities)
makes it possible to derive a probability distribution for the degree of a
randomly selected individual i ∈ Ir. Since κi = ∑
q
v=1 κi
v, we ﬁrst have
to determine the distribution of the random variables κi
v,1 ≤ v ≤ q.
Theorem 5.1 tells us that κi
v has a Binomial distribution with parameters
(|Iv| − δr,v, p
(β,ξ)
r|v ) (see e.g. Bollobás, 1998).
Proposition 5.1. Given an action partition I pick a player i ∈ Ir and let

































where R(β,ξ)(I) is the normalizing factor.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Observe that for the degree distribution it sufﬁces to know the number of
players in the various action classes, not their identity. Hence, all action
partitions I that put the same number of players into the various classes
are equivalent in terms of the connectivity structure of the network. Thus,
instead of looking at a speciﬁc action partition I, it is sufﬁcient to work
with less information contained in a tuple n = (n1,...,nq) such that nv =
|Iv| for all v and ∑
q
v=1 nv = N.




We will examine the degree distribution for 1-players under various parameter
constellations (β,ξ) for the frequency vector n = (80,20). Figure 1 shows
the degree distribution for a typical 1-player under the parameter constellation
(β,ξ) = (0.5,70). The mean degree of 1-players is seen to be 78. However, we
Figure 1: Degree distributions for 1-players under various parameter con-
stellations. The triple at the top of each plot is (β,ξ, ¯ k), i.e. the noise and
volatility rate and the resulting average degree for this action class. The
point marks the position of the mean of this distribution.
cannot say to which action class most of this links lead to since we only look at
the distribution of the total degree κ. Applying Theorem 5.1, we get complete








Note that p1|1 → 1 as β → 0, implying that in this limit only links within the
same action class exist with probability 1. Consequently, for small noise levels
the majority of the 78 neighbors will be 1-players as well. For larger levels of
noise (the right ﬁgure with β = 1.5) we observe a drastically smaller average
18degree. This implies that the effect of the parameter values β and ξ goes into the
same direction. Increasing β with constant ξ will have qualitatively the same
effect as increasing ξ with constant β.
6 An invariant distribution over action proﬁles
Having derived a probability distribution on the set of networks, we will
now derive a probability distribution on the set of action frequency vec-
tors n = (n1,...,nq). Let D := {n ∈ Nq|∑
q
r=1 nr = N} denote the
set of admissible action frequency vectors and deﬁne the correspondence
Ψ : D → 2Ω as Ψ(n) = {ω ∈ Ω|(∀r = 1,2,...,q) : |Ir(ω)| = nr}.
Proposition 6.1. The invariant distribution over action frequency vectors n ∈
D is given by the mapping ρ(β,ξ) = µ(β,ξ) ◦ Ψ : D → [0,1], deﬁned as



















































Proof. The proof starts from the distribution over action classes I (5.2).
The rest is a simple combinatorial exercise. The population consists of
N distinct elements. There are q different boxes over which we want to
distribute the N elements, and in each box r = 1,...,q there should be nr
elements at the end of the day, and all N elements must be in one box, so
that ∑
q
r=1 nr = N holds. There are N!
n1!...nq! different ways of solving this
allocation problem. Counting all states ω that agree with a given action






















19Using the respective deﬁnitions of the maps ρ(β,ξ) and z
(β,ξ)
r (n) yields the
desired result.
7 Stochastic stability
Stochastic game dynamics have become important due to their power
concerning equilibrium selection. The concept of stochastic stability, in-
troduced by Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993) and Kandori et al.
(1993) into game theory, gives a selection criterion based on the underly-
ing dynamic process.




The set of stochastically stable states is denoted as Ω∗.
It has been shown by Blume (1993; 1997) and Young (1998) that the logit
dynamics concentrates on the set of potential maximizers as the noise
level goes to zero. However, their results are not directly applicable in the
current context, since the graph is itself part of the state variable.
7.1 Selection of Potential maximizers
The following Theorem, the proof of which is based on the general dis-
cussion in Catoni (1999), is the main result of this section.
Theorem 7.1. The Gibbs distribution (4.6) concentrates on the set P := argmaxω∈Ω P(ω)
as β → 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This shows that in the limit of vanishingly small noise the process will
spend almost all of its time in the vicinity of potential maximizers. In
view of the relation between the potential function and aggregate utility,
20this gives an efﬁciency result for long run behavior. Furthermore, in view
of the ergodic theorem, which has been mentioned brieﬂy in Section 4,
we know that long run averages of the potential function converge to the
expected value under the invariant distribution µ(β,ξ). Since this expected
value converges to maxω∈Ω P(ω) as β → 0, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 7.1. Let U := argmax
ω∈Ω
U(ω) = P. Then
lim
β→0
µ(β,ξ)(U) = 1 (7.1)
Almost surely therefore the process arrives at states where social welfare
is maximized.
7.2 Efﬁciency in pure coordination games
Consider the class of games with payoff function u(a,a0) := φ(a,a0) − c,
that satisﬁes condition (2.1), as well as
(∀r = 1,2,...,q) : max
1≤v≤q
φ(av,ar) = φ(ar,ar),
φ(a1,a1) ≤ φ(a2,a2) ≤ ... ≤ φ(aq,aq).
(7.2)
The ﬁrst condition states that matching the action chosen by the opponent
is always a best reply. The second condition imposes an ordering on the
payoffs of actions, where aq denotes the payoff dominant action. From the
symmetry of the payoff function, eq. (2.1), it follows that there are q strict
Nash equilibria in the base game where the two players choose the same
action. The constant c ≥ 0 has no strategic effect, and can be interpreted
as the costs of a link.5 To keep notation simple, suppose that all strict
Nash equilibria have different payoffs. Let ge = g(Ge), gc = g(Gc) denote
the empty and the complete graph, respectively.
5Jackson and Watts (2002), Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) consider symmetric 2×2
coordination games, which are potential games, having this payoff structure.
21Proposition 7.1. Let P : Ω → R be the potential function (4.4), and suppose





{(aq,...,aq)} × {gc} ,if u(aq,aq) > 0
(AI × {ge}) ∪ {ω ∈ Ω|α = (aq,...,aq)} ,if u(aq,aq) = 0
AI × {ge} ,if u(aq,aq) < 0


















From this one can immediately see the validity of the claim for the high-
cost scenario u(aq,aq) < 0.
Now consider the case where u(aq,aq) = 0. Clearly P(ω) ≤ 0 for all
ω ∈ Ω, with equality only at the states that are in the set described in the
text of the Proposition.
Finally, consider the case u(aq,aq) > 0. Since this is the largest payoff
obtainable from the base game, and the potential function is linear in the
links, the claim follows. This is also the unique maximizer of the potential
function.
Corollary 7.2. Consider the co-evolutionary model Mβ, with base game from
the class of pure-coordination games (7.2). Then Ω∗ = P.
8 A general class of stochastic co-evolutionary dy-
namics
The model presented so far relied on the assumptions that the base game
has an exact potential, and the rate functions of the individual players
have the particular form (3.4). These assumptions make the model very
tractable, and we were able to deduce many fundamental characteristics
22of the long-run behavior of the system. On the other hand, one may
say that these assumptions are too strict. Let me shortly discuss how
the model can be extended to a rather general class of co-evolutionary
models with noise. For a detailed discussion I refer to the companion
paper Staudigl (2009b). There a rather general class of of perturbed time-
homogeneous Markov chains, similar to Mβ, is presented, where players
may have heterogenous preferences in the base game, but choose from a
common action set.6 A general characterization of the invariant distrib-
ution of such models is provided, as well as an algorithm which identi-
ﬁes stochastically stable states, based on tree-constructions in the spirit
of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998). The present model ﬁts into this general
framework, and let me just sketch what the long run behavior of this
model would be, if one drops Assumptions 1 and 2. Instead of (3.4), as-
sume that the players’ rate function equals λi(ω) = λ1{κi(ω)<N−1}, and λ
is a positive constant. For sake of illustration suppose the base game is a
symmetric 2× 2 coordination game with one Pareto efﬁcient equilibrium
(a1,a1), and one risk-dominant equilibrium (a2,a2). The speciﬁc payoffs
are not important.7 I claim that these small alterations of the model lead
to a non-selection result. Any pair of players, which use the same action,
may be connected in the long-run equilibrium; putting it differently, as β
goes to zero we do not obtain a point prediction as in Section 7, but the
limit distribution will (in general) put positive weight on a proper subset
of Ω. The heuristic explanation of this “negative” result is the following.
• Since the rate function of players is uncoupled with the noise pa-
rameter, the speed of the link creation process is unaffected by the
level of noise. Looking back at (3.4), we see that as β goes to 0 the
link creation process becomes arbitrary fast.
• The link destruction process deletes any edge with the constant rate
6An extension to different action sets is possible, but does not give more insights in
the model.
7Of course, this is still a potential game.
23ξ. This process is pure drift, i.e. it is not depending on the base
game, and in particular is independent of the noise level β. In the
terminology of stochastic stability calculus, this implies that link
destructions are zero cost events. However, it turns out that the
rate-ratio λ/ξ determines the number of links the system can carry
in the long run.
• The logit choice function of the action adjustment process (3.2) puts
equal probability on all actions a loner may choose. However, if a
player has at least one neighbor and if β goes to zero, this player
will play a best response against the neighbors’ behavior with prob-
ability arbitrary close to 1.
• Suppose the system is currently in a full coordination state, say the
population coordinates on the efﬁcient equilibrium (a1,...,a1). The
network will not be complete in general, but one can derive a dis-
tribution over networks, given this action conﬁguration. If there are
some loners in the current state, let them switch to a2, and give
them a link creation opportunity. These steps can be made with
zero costs. Now, by deﬁnition of the coordination game, an optimal
decision in the link creation process is to connect the a2 players. We
are then already in a state where a1 and a2 co-exist. At this state no
player has an incentive to change his action, so we will not return
to the state we were coming from. If there are no loners, we can
construct a sequence of link destruction, action adjustment and link
creation events, all causing no costs, which leads to a state where
two coordination equilibria co-exist, as follows: Destroy the links
of player i. Give him an action adjustment opportunity where he
chooses a2. Since a loner may choose any action with equal prob-
ability without making an error, this causes no costs. Do the same
thing with player j 6= i. Then give them a link creation opportunity.
Since i and j are the only agents playing a2, an optimal decision
24in the link creation process is to create the link (i, j). Now we are
in a co-existence state and no player has an incentive to change his
action.
• In the same vein we can walk through the set
Ω∗ = {ω ∈ Ω|gi
j = 1 ⇒ αi = αj}
without any costs, in the sense of stochastic stability analysis. As a
result, all states contained in this set are stochastically stable.
A similar result, but with admittedly sharper limit predictions, is ob-
tained in the model of Jackson and Watts (2002). These authors add to
the drift term ξ a direction, by assuming that only links where at least
one player is better off after the destruction of the link, are very likely to
become destroyed. For a fairly large set of parameters (such as linking
costs as in Section 7) they also get a co-existence result. However, due to
this directionality in the link destruction process, they get sharper limit
results in the network dimension under the assumptions that the costs
per link are constant. The framework presented in Staudigl (2009b) is
sufﬁciently ﬂexible to capture the model of Jackson and Watts (2002).
9 Conclusion
This paper presented a stylized model on the co-evolution of networks
and play in the class of potential games. Assumption 2 was crucial to
derive a closed-form solution of the unique invariant distribution and to
obtain sharp predictions as the noise in the players’ decision rules goes
to zero. A general selection theorem of potential maximizers applies in
this case. Without Assumption 2 the invariant distribution can still be
completely characterized, but the model loses its predictive power in the
low-noise limit. It seems therefore that some assumptions in this direc-
tion are needed if one wants to obtain sharp limiting predictions.
25There are many possible routes for extensions. In a companion work
(Staudigl, 2009a) I analyze the current model with Assumption 2, but
assuming an inverse relationship in the rate function with the size of
the population. The intuition is that a larger population should make it
less likely that a single agent receives the chance to create a link. In the
inﬁnitely large population limit and small positive noise the generated
networks do not converge to complete graphs anymore. Hence, nicer as-
ymptotic results are obtained without losing much in analytical power.
A more fundamental question is, however, which class of networks (in the
sense of random graph theory) such co-evolutionary models are capable
to create. One ﬁrst step in this direction is the companion work Staudigl
(2009b). There I propose a rather general model of co-evolutionary mod-
els with noise, which is rich enough to incorporate the just presented
model, as well as the “volatility” models of Ehrhardt et al. (2008b) and
Jackson and Watts (2002). A ﬁrst result is that such models seem to
generate, under fairly mild assumptions on the structure of the random
process, so-called inhomogeneous random graphs (see e.g. the nice sur-
vey by Newman, 2003). These models are straightforward extensions of
the classical Erdös-Rényi model, where the edge-success probabilities de-
pend on the attributes of the individual vertices. It would be interesting
to see how deep this connection indeed is.
A Proofs of Selected Theorems and Propositions
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Uniqueness follows from irreducibility and recurrence of
ηβ.
By construction of the dynamics, we know that changes occur in the process
only in one “coordinate”: either a single change in the links of the network takes
place, or one, and almost surely only one, player switches to another action.
By statistical independence of these two processes we can treat them separately.
Start with a change in the network structure. It sufﬁces to consider the creation
of a fresh link. Let ω = (α, g), ˆ ω = (α, g ⊕ (i, j)) ∈ Ω. The rate of link creation
26between players i and j is given by eq. (3.8). The rate with which one returns to







It is easy to see that the measure (4.2) satisﬁes this condition.
Now consider the event of action adjustment. Let player k be the one who
receives such an opportunity and suppose she switches to action av ∈ A. Let
ω, ˆ ω = (α
av
k , g) ∈ Ω be the states involved in this transition. The associated rate
ratio is
ηβ(ω → ˆ ω)











































Note that the second term on the right-hand side does not depend on player k,
and thus the change in the action of this player does have no effect on this term.

















Since ˆ αi = αi for all i 6= k, ˆ αk = av, and payoffs as well as the indicators gi
j are



























This is the rate ratio (A.2).






















the mass of state ω, conditional on the event that the action partition I is realized. Then












Proof. We have to compute ∑ω∈Ω m(β,ξ)(ω|I). On Ω(I) the action proﬁle is



























































A direct calculation of this ratio gives Eq. (5.3).
(b) This follows directly from the product measure (5.3) and the deﬁnition of
the Erdös-Rényi-model.
28Proof of Proposition 5.1. For ease of notation I skip again the parameters (β,ξ).
κi
1,...,κi
q are independent Binomially distributed random variables with respec-
tive parameters (nv − δr,v, pr|v),1 ≤ v ≤ q. Thus
P(κi = k1,...,κi





v = kv|I,i ∈ Ir),
where for 1 ≤ v ≤ q
P(κi












The function fr|v(·) has been deﬁned in the text of the Proposition. There are
k!
k1!···kq! ways to construct a list (k1,...,kq) whose sum equals k. Hence







P(κi = kv|I,i ∈ Ir).
In each of the products on the right hand side, the factor (1 − pr|v)nv−δr,v is a






P(κi = k|I,i ∈ Ir),
and call fr,κ(k|I) := P(κi = k|I,i ∈ Ir) to get the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. For any ε > 0 consider the set Aε := {ω ∈ Ω|P(ω) <
maxω0∈Ω P(ω0)−ε}. I will show that lim
β→0
µ(β,ξ)(Aε) = 0. Let P∗ := maxω0∈Ω P(ω0)
the global maximum value of the potential function, and P = argmaxω∈Ω P(ω)
the set of maximizers. Deﬁne the measure µ
ξ
0 : G → [0,∞], g 7→ µ
ξ
0(g) :=
(2/ξ)e(g). Since the Hamiltonian of the Gibbs measure is additive separable in
the measure µ
ξ
0 and the potential function P, we get for all ω = (α, g)
µ(β,ξ)(α, g) ∝ e
1





The set Aε can be written as




























with Z = ∑ω∈Ω e
1
β H(ω,β,ξ) ≥ |P|e
1
β H∗





0(g) > 0 be the minimum value of the graph measure on the set of































































|P|K > 0 a factor independent of β and ε. For β → 0 the
upper bound goes to zero, establishing the result.
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